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ABSTRACT 
How is the segmented and disoriented world of contemporary historical scholarship, in 
particular, that of American political history, to be reintegrated and revived? Instead of 
imposing a substantive synthesis, which would narrow the discipline's focus by excluding 
many interesting topics, I propose that historians adopt a common approach--rational choice 
theory--that has proven useful in economics and political science. 
Using notions drawn from rational choice and examples primarily from the American 
Civil War and Reconstruction period, I examine the assumptions behind and arguments for 
three theories in intellectual/cultural history--republicanism, "political culture," and 
positive/negative liberalism. I then try to spell out some of the implications of rational 
choice models for the study of electoral, legislative, judicial, and administrative behavior. 
TOW ARD "TOTAL POLITICAL HISTORY" l
Political history is at an impasse.2 As the subjects of history expanded in the 1 960s and
70s, and as the prospects of societal change through political means seemed to dim in the 
1 980s ,  the study of war, diplomacy, and the writings and sayings of statesmen--the principal 
raw materials of the old political history--lost favor with students and young professors alike. 
Despite the emergence of the "new political history" in the 1960s and its spread to British and 
European, as well as American topics, many, perhaps most of the publishing scholars who 
remain devoted to political history continue unperturbedly to churn out biographies or 
narratives of facets of minor administrative or electoral matters that contain no overt theory 
and reflect little apparent consciousness of larger questions or of parallel studies of other 
times and places. 3
The organizing frameworks of politically centered history--Beard's class analysis, 
Turner's stress on sectional splits, Hartz's Lockeian consensus, Benson's ethnoculturalism, 
Burnham's critical elections theory--have come under telling attack.4 Calls for synthesis
increase in inverse proportion to effective examples of it.5
Recent appeals for a revival of interest in power and state formation merely emphasize 
the impression that political history has become a backwater.6 Social and economic historians
often either assert that political contests and decisions were irrelevant to their subjects' lives 
or casually project the implications of their studies onto the political plane without 
performing the detailed research into political events and institutions that would be necessary 
to sustain their conclusions.7 Many Marxists dismiss quantitative historians as apologists for
bourgeois pluralism, Braudellians scorn all political history as mired in the superficial and 
transitory, while spokespersons for the New Right condemn the "new history" for shattering 
myths that they allege are necessary for national unity and legitimacy.8 Those who can't
count and refuse to learn damn cliometric works as boring and elitist, and as futile attempts 
to apply the methods and modes of the physical sciences to the fundamentally indeterminant 
thoughts and actions of humans, and they themselves often proceed as if quantifiable 
evidence were inferior to that from lettristic sources or were inconsequential for all really 
important questions.9
Yet at the same time, many subfields are flourishing. Historians of political thought 
continue to produce subtle readings of texts and bold reinterpretations of ideational trends. 10
Studies of electoral behavior show steady improvement in  methodological sophistication, 
conceptual clarity, and depth and scope of qualitative as well as quantitative research. 1 1
Systematic and often explicitly comparative analyses of the adoption and effects of public 
policies have begun to cumulate. 1 2  Undoubtedly some of these advances have occurred
because scholars could explore tightly demarcated areas more thoroughly than unlimited ones 
and could follow and respond to a small literature more easily than to an open-ended one. 
There are benefits as well as costs to fragmentation. 
Nonetheless, these costs now seem too great for three reasons. First, ignorance of one 
subfield may undermine conclusions in another, or, at the least, it may call into question the 
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generalizability of particular findings. Egalitarian political rhetoric, for instance, may mask 
anti-egalitarian policies, and conclusions based on the one may be seriously compromised by 
an examination of the other. 1 3  Second, concepts developed in one area of a discipline, such
as political theory or legislative behavior, may be inapplicable to others, rendering 
explanations that connect two or more such categories difficult if not impossible. If schemas 
drawn from symbolic anthropology are assumed to explain voter behavior, for example, then 
how do elected officials set policy, and what sort of theory could tie the two together? 
Third, narrowness may feed narrowness. Segmentation within political history may also 
encourage its divorce from social and economic history, as well as from the adjacent 
disciplines of economics, political science and sociology. Implications of theories and 
findings in one division of knowledge may therefore be overlooked. How has geographic 
mobility affected party loyalty, and what impact have changes in economic conditions had on 
electoral behavior? Rather than the unifying hub of history that it once was, the study of 
past politics threatens to become a collection of tidy, segregated subdivisions containing only 
logically incomplete explanations, isolated from the stimulus and challenge of continuous 
intra- and inter-disciplinary contacts, overspecialized, and, therefore, ignored by the rest of 
the historical and social scientific communities. 
Perhaps the most common response to a recognition of the present crisis in political and 
social history has been to advocate some substantive synthesis. 1 4  To appreciate the
inadequacy of this solution, one must first understand how the subdivisions of political 
history fit together, what models of human behavior underlie several recent constructs, and 
why these notions are either incomplete or dubious. As long as historians stay wedded to 
current ways of proceeding, political history can never be unified, and research designs will 
be fundamentally flawed. Having demonstrated some inadequacies in presently fashionable 
conceptions, I shall propose in this paper that political historians adopt an approach that 
offers at least the possibility of a common strategy for understanding political phenomena 
and that has proven useful in economics and political science- -rational choice theory. 
Besides spelling out some of the implications that may be drawn from that vast, and, to 
historians, largely unknown literature, I shall illustrate some of the problems of current 
practice and some of the heuristic leads to be derived from rational choice theory by 
examining a series of related questions about politics during the period of the American Civil 
War and Reconstruction. 
Each subdivision of political history is incomplete, and each has imperial tendencies. 
Writers in each tend, at least implicitly, to expand their conclusions into other areas and not 
to consider the implications of findings or data from the others for their own work. Thus, 
histories of political thought, ideologies, or cultures often seem to be predicated upon the 
belief that ideas are sufficient by themselves to explain the motives for political behavior and 
the implications of those actions. 1 5  Studies of elites commonly assume that if we know what
the really important people said, and perhaps what they did, then we know why they acted, 
why the masses supported or opposed them, and what produced certain outcomes. 1 6  Students
of extraparliamentary collective action sometimes infer the political preferences and social 
conditions of the masses from the expressed grievances of a comparative few, and nearly 
always scorn the quotidian world of conventional electioneering, which may also reflect the 
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wishes of the masses, and bureaucracy, whose lumbering, unromantic processes may have had 
more lasting effects on society than more picturesque outbursts did. 1 7  Electoral histories
frequently presume that if we can determine the coalitions that voted for each candidate or 
did not vote, and the issues that, at least plausibly, shaped those coalitions, then we can 
deduce what policies were adopted, why they were adopted, and what their impacts were. 1 8
Treatises o n  electoral arrangements typically postulate that if we can find out how the rules 
were shaped and who was responsible for designing them, then we know the constraints on 
the transformation of social into political alignments and the desired and attained 
consequences of those lineups. 1 9  Legislative and judicial histories in many instances start
from the results of electoral decisions and reason backward to the electoral formations and 
forward to the fruits of legal changes.20 Those who focus on administration routinely infer,
rather than determine empirically, the effects of policies as well as their legislative, 
executive, and judicial preconditions.2 1  Impact analysts regularly take all previous stages as 
if they had already been read. 22
Consider, for example, three recent and related themes in the history of American 
political thought--republicanism, political culture, and the notion of positive and negative 
liberalism. Studies of ideas can focus on one or more of three levels--individuals, small 
groups, and vast collections of persons, often whole societies. For the first two, texts, letters, 
and descriptions of behavior usually exhaust the evidence, and the trails of inference are 
typically short. Data for the latter is generally much thinner and more diverse, and the path 
from fact to conclusion is usually long and tangled . Gaps between the levels are greater and 
leaps between them, more perilous than historians sometimes appear to realize.23 Perhaps
reacting against the Progressive historians' muckraking assumption that political rhetoric was 
almost never a true guide to the motives of political actors, recent historians of political 
thought sometimes seem to assume that it always is. In any case, it is with the third, societal 
level that this paper is primarily concerned. 
The republicanism thesis doubles as both a consensus and a conflict theory.24 In Bernard
Bailyn's version, Americans absorbed the writings of the eighteenth century English 
"commonwealthmen" and became hypersensitive to signs of government corruption and to the 
expansion of state power in general. Thus, the American Revolution was a preemptive revolt 
against an imagined attempt to extend a big government of grasping, self-interested placemen 
to the colonies. According to J. G. A. Pocock, the lineage descends from Florentine 
Renaissance humanists, and its positive aspect was the ideal of civic virtue. Pushing ahead 
some decades, Sean Wilentz finds "artisan republicanism," with its core beliefs in 
independence and community, inspiring post- 1 830 entrepreneurs, who used the individualist 
cudgel to beat down collective action by employees, as well as workers, who condemned the 
"egoistic competition" fostered by capitalists as an attack on equal rights and social harmony. 
In Hegelian fashion, in other words, Wilentz splits the republican synthesis into 
individualistic thesis and communitarian antithesis . Closer to the mainstream of political 
history, Mills Thornton depicts a political style common to Alabama's Jacksonians and Whigs, 
who played on the electors' paranoia about threats to their autonomy, alleged attempts to 
reduce them to subservience by wealthy planters and urban capitalists within the state and 
hierarchy-ridden Yankees in the nation. In a related work, covering the whole country, 
Michael Holt contends that a republican tradition of "self-government, liberty, and equality 
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for whites," shared by all white Americans, motivated the behavior of both sides in the 
antebellum sectional conflict. People in each region saw threats to the government's 
responsiveness to popular opinion as coming from the other.25
Although the models underlying the Republicanism thesis have rarely if ever been 
explicitly elaborated, two might be proposed. In the first, the semiological interpretation, 
inherited language constrained thought and, therefore, action. American politics developed 
differently from European not because Americans had a different social or economic 
structure or greater economic resources, but because they inherited a constricted political 
language of individualism, equal rights (for Caucasians, at least), and libertarianism. 
Collectivist, cooperative, or openly hierarchical solutions were simply unthinkable in this 
country. In the second, the behavioral interpretation, whatever the contrast with other 
countries, expressed values led straightforwardly to actions. People did what they did for the 
reasons that their leaders said. If antebellum northern politicians said that they feared a 
southern conspiracy, that is what they meant and that is why the electorate voted Republican 
in 1 860. Proponents of the various republican theses do not openly seek to refute other 
possible hypotheses, such as that politicians and voters might have a variety of less well 
articulated or unarticulated motives, including straightforward economic self-interest, that 
political structures might constrain the range of feasible options, and that different groups 
might act for reasons so diverse that they cannot usefully be subsumed under one grand 
rubric. 
A related but even less specific notion, that of "political culture," has recently become all­
pervasive. Once one notices it, the phrase crops up everywhere. Political culture might be 
defined as the understandings with which a group in a particular era approached politics-­
Whig or Democratic or working class or American political culture. While the currency of 
republicanism is the rhetoric of shared ideals, that of political culture is the symbol; the one 
draws on philosophy, the other is closer to anthropology and literary criticism; the first 
emphasizes a consensus on values and explains conflict by differences in empirical 
observations or societal positions, while the second stresses clashes between subcultures. 
Proponents of republicanism are "lumpers," pointing to similarities across all groups; devotees 
of political culture explanations are usually "splitters," emphasizing differences between 
subsets of the population. While one might suppose that both would concentrate on the 
question of how to assess the importance of such similarities and differences, neither has. 
Advocates of cultural explanations of politics often explicitly avow their dependence on 
symbolic anthropology, and their favorite authors are Clifford Geertz and Victor Turner.26
In Geertz's Balinese cockfight view of mankind, as reflected in the work of the proto­
Geertzians Richard Hofstadter and David Herbert Donald, or the self-consciously Geertzian 
Jean Baker, political action is symbolic, not instrumentally rational. Populists endorsed 
inflationism and the subtreasury not to increase their incomes, but in a nostalgic effort to 
restore a past "golden age;" abolitionists condemned slavery not just because they thought it 
wrong, but as part of a subtle, oblique attack on the status of rising northern capitalists; 
northern Democrats opposed racially egalitarian policies such as black suffrage not so much 
because they feared losing political power as because "the Negro became a code for the 
despised innovations of Civil War and Reconstruction," a code that historians should interpret 
by reviewing minstrel shows, not campaign debates or election returns.27 Elections are most
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profitably studied as "rituals," "ceremonies," involving "a series of expressive actions and 
hidden agendas," not as exercises in purposive choice between public policies.28
Another theoretical prop for political culture interpretations derives from Robert K. 
Merton's concept of "negative reference groups." In this view, people somehow form positive 
and negative identifications with certain social groups, such as religious or ethnic ones, 
define others as adversaries, and enter politics to put them down. Issues become merely 
convenient weapons in largely sham battles over relative prestige and nonmaterial societal 
position.29 Neither Merton nor his chief historical follower, Lee Benson, made clear how
positive or negative reference groups formed or maintained themselves, how they overcame 
the "free rider problem," or why they were satisfied with merely play-acted victories or 
defeats .30
Closely related to both the political culture and republican views is  the positive and 
negative liberalism thesis. Here, the Democrats are cast as the heirs of anti-statist 
republicanism and the Whigs and Republicans as advocates of government intervention to 
stop drinking, promote economic growth, and deprive the slaveholders of their slaves. In Lee 
Benson's vision, the roots of these contrary impulses lay in religious tendencies: evangelicals 
were activist do-gooders, while ritualists opposed the collective imposition of moral codes. 
Whether these were absolute differences or only proclivities, whether each side's stands were 
somehow causally related to each other or merely a cluster of similar positions, and how 
much inconsistency in the behavior of the opposing forces would invalidate the thesis are not 
spelled out by proponents. 
The model of man behind this theory is a variety of cultural determinism. Politics 
merely reflects the general orientations that people form elsewhere, particularly in church, 
and then bring with them to the voting booth. The rules of the process and the machinations 
of politicians do not shape political outcomes. 
Although rational choice theorists generally do not attempt to explain how and why 
people arrive at their preferences, they do pay a great deal of attention to the problems of 
how opinions are organized and how they should be represented. 3 1  A brief introduction to
one of the best developed tools of rational choice, the spatial model, will not only give the 
reader some feel for the style of the approach, but will also illuminate some of the 
difficulties in relating attitudes to each other and to behavior that plague the republicanism, 
political culture, and positive/negative liberalism approaches. 
Perhaps the easiest way to visualize opinion is through the one-dimensional spatial model 
(Figure 1 ) . In this figure, the endpoints of the scale are the extreme proslavery and 
antislavery positions, and the points in between reflect possible stances on the issue. Each 
person is assumed, at any particular time, to have an "ideal point" or "bliss point;" that is, a 
policy that she would like the nation to adopt. William Lloyd Garrison, for example, would 
prefer point "G"; George Fitzhugh, "N"; Stephen A. Douglas, "P"; David Wilmot, "W"; and so 
on. Given a choice between all these positions, assuming that each had a substantial 
probability of winning, and that there were no other significant issues, each person would 
vote for candidates or proposals nearest her ideal point. That none of these assumptions is 
plausible emphasizes the difficulty of inferences of attitudes from such behavior as voting, 
and suggests that more complex models are needed. A political structure biased toward two-
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party competition and generally risk-averse politicians who fear to take extreme positions 
constrain the choice set offered to voters. Many electors may agree with the issue stances 
taken by minor parties, but vote "strategically" for one of the major parties because the 
minors' present chances are so small. 
(Figure 1 about here) 
Figure 2 presents a two-dimensional spatial model, in which a union/secession dimension 
has been added to the one on slavery. Here, Garrison's point "G" is close to that of the 
southern fire-eaters (point "F") on the union issue, but very far away on the slavery 
spectrum. Lincoln (point "L") and the southern Whigs (point "W") also agree on the value of 
the union and disagree, although not so much as Garrison and the fire-eaters do, on slavery. 
Buchanan (point "B") is represented as an extreme doughface, indifferent to the union. 
(Figure 2 about here) 
Adding a second dimension emphasizes three additional features of the analysis of public 
opinion. First, a person's position on a particular proposal, say, the Wilmot Proviso, may 
have been a function of his stance on two or more larger issues, which may not have 
correlated perfectly. It is perfectly reasonable to say that one might prefer to see slavery 
abolished entirely, but that since such a proposal would induce the south to secede, one 
would settle for ending slavery in the territories. Therefore, later analysts cannot 
unambiguously determine attitudes on slavery or any other issue from expressions of opinion 
or votes relating only to that issue unless all relevant issues were directly correlated. 32 To be
perfectly correlated in the two dimensional case, the positions of nearly everyone would have 
to fall on a line at a 45 degree angle to each axis. Second, the positive and negative 
liberalism thesis, and perhaps the republicanism thesis, imply that all issues were interrelated 
in just that manner. This hypothesis might be represented by figure 3, in which the arrows 
indicate the posited direction of causation. 
(Figure 3 about here) 
In this model, a fundamental political attitude, based on a pietistic or liturgical religious 
orientation, is said to induce people to take identical stances on a set of important political 
issues. These specific stances might either be envisioned as caused by a general orientation 
toward government action, or as summed up by that orientation.33  Representing the
hypothesis in this manner immediately reveals two difficulties: people may not line up the 
same way on all issues (pietistic southerners, for example, may oppose prohibition and/or 
abolition) and the endpoints may not be analogous to each other (Is public funding for 
parochial schools not intervention by government? Could slavery exist without law?). A 
third point suggested by the two-dimensional figure is that expressed opinions on policy 
could shift as a result of the rise or fading of other concerns. After Fort Sumter, 
northerners' fears of endangering the union by taking extreme positions on slavery vanished. 
Indeed, by late 1 862, the view that victory and reunion depended on abolition united Lincoln 
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and Garrison. Conversely, by the spring of 1 865, some southerners became convinced that 
only by abolishing slavery could they preserve the Confederacy, while others, no doubt the 
majority, believed that without slavery, secession was pointless. 34 Events had twisted the
union axis by 1 80 degrees in the north,  but Dixie, relatively united on disunionism and 
proslavery in 186 1 , had split apart by 1 865.  Opinions on slavery certainly changed during 
the war, but the growing popularity of abolitionism during the war, once the constraint of 
preserving the union was lifted,  suggests that northern opinion had been much more 
fundamentally antislavery before the war than historians have of ten claimed. 
Of course, there are generally more than two issues, people's opinions differ not only on 
what to do, but on how important each issue is , and people change their minds. Although it 
is difficult to represent three or more issues geometrically, there is no difficulty in doing so 
algebraically. Suppose we scale each issue from 1 to 1 0. 35 Then the positive/negative
liberalism thesis can be expressed as the prediction that someone taking position 1 (pietist) on 
the religious dimension would also be likely to take position 1 ,  or close to it, on the dry, 
slavery, and school issues, and on any other related ones that cropped up in the future. His 
ordered "4-tupple" of preferences on the issues would be {l , 1 , 1 , l} .  But even if  people's 
preferences were correlated across issues, they might differ on the weights they placed on 
each and on the certainty with which they held their positions. To represent these facets of 
opinions in our algebraic formulation, we can simply add more lines ("vectors") to the issues 
vector to form a series of related vectors that might be called an "opinion matrix." 
(Figure 4 about here) 
In Figure 4, each issue has associated with it a weight, scaled from 1 to 10 ,  and an index 
of certainty, similarly scaled. The individual portrayed considers the last two issues very 
important, the first, nearly as important, but the second, relatively unimportant. If she were 
considering which of two candidates to vote for, she would place much less emphasis on their 
stances on issue 2 than on issues 3 and 4. Furthermore, while her view on issue 3 is very 
firm, she is not so sure of herself on issue 4, and even less committed on issues 1 and 2 .  
Thus, she might easily b e  convinced to change her mind between elections o r  during an 
election campaign on the first two issues. 
These explicit mathematical representations of attitudes provide a vantage point for 
evaluating the republicanism, political culture, and positive/negative liberalism approaches. 
All three theories seek not only to describe attitudes but to explain their genesis and change 
and their influence on behavior. Not the least of the virtues of spatial models is to remind 
us of a series of truisms about research design and inference that are too often ignored in 
practice. First, a leader's attitudes may differ from those of his followers, who may vote for 
or otherwise signal their allegiance to him because, given the available choices, his position is 
closer to theirs than that of any other leader. A research design that offers only evidence 
about leaders' opinions as evidence for the views of the masses is therefore fundamentally 
incorrect. 36
Second, people's positions may shift for a variety of reasons. The mobbing of William 
Lloyd Garrison converted Wendell Phillips to abolitionist activism, the plight of fugitive 
slaves aroused antislavery feelings in myriad northerners, and southern intransigence and the 
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contribution of black soldiers and sailors to the war effort shifted northern white opinion in 
an antislavery direction. Paradoxically, none of the three historical theories accommodates 
change very well, while that derived from social science offers at least the possibility of 
modeling alteration over time. 
Third, none of the historical theories is easily confined to a specific subset of the 
population at a single time. Baker and Howe admit that many partisans of the other party 
shared much of the political culture of Democrats or Whigs, and that many in each party 
deviated from the party stands. Their descriptions, in other words, are of groups that 
overlapped considerably on the spectrum of opinion, and they propose no means for 
determining the central tendency or degree of variation of opinion in each party. 
Fourth, expressions of opinion may not be "sincere"--that is, people may not reveal their 
"true" positions because they wish to move opinion closer to them in a sequence of votes, or 
because they are not offered a full range of choices, or because they have multiple 
objectives. For instance, Congressmen may defeat moderate proposals in order to force 
moderates to join them in later votes against extremists from the other side; voters in winner­
take-all elections may opt for their second or third choices to prevent the election of their 
least favored alternative; politicians aiming at election may stay within the bounds of public 
opinion. 37 Thus, the failure of the Crittenden Compromise should have startled no one; the
fact that men in some northern states made the Know-Nothings, rather than the Republicans 
temporarily the chief opposition party to the Democrats is no sure sign that they truly 
weighed nativism higher than antislavery in their preference functions; and the Republicans' 
unwillingness to move beyond free-soilism until after secession does not prove that they 
really wished to leave southern slavery alone.38
Fifth, since behavior is  often an indication of attitudes, any descriptive analysis of 
attitudes must attempt to distinguish slogans and rationalizations from "true" avowals of 
belief. The statement of a northerner who claimed to be against slavery, but voted for John 
C. Breckinridge in 1 860 is suspect. Nineteenth century paeans to republican virtue, liberty, 
and equality should be treated with the same healthy skepticism that we apply to similar 
orotundities today. The admission of advocates of the republicanism thesis that there was a 
growing disjunction between "rhetoric and reality" even during the Revolution, and that it 
widened later should raise suspicions about the accuracy of the description of rhetoric. 39
All three theories seem to assume that attitudes produce behavior, rather than vice-versa, 
and all are vague on whether a basic orientation causes people to take specific issue stances 
or whether that orientation merely summarizes positions on a series of related issues.40
Figure 3 brings these issues to attention and suggests the need for clarification. Recent 
articles by the social psychologist Thomas F. Pettigrew suggest that in some instances, 
changed behavior can precede and influence attitudes. Forced by the national government to 
accept substantial amounts of racial integration in schools and public accommodations, white 
southerners subsequently gave substantially more liberal responses on the desirability of 
interracial contacts.4 1 The failure of secession and the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment
seems to have reduced southern white proslavery opinion. Howard Schuman et al. found that 
white attitudes on particular racial issues in America from the 1 940s to the 1 980s were by no 
means all of one piece. Trends in survey answers to questions about racial intermarriage or 
housing were not precisely parallel to those about busing or the integration of public 
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places. 42 To array all these views under the single rubric of "racism" or to contend that a
person's position on a general racist dimension caused her to take specific stands or to behave 
in a particular manner seems misleading. 
Values, thoughts, and attitudes have never been the only dependent variables, the only 
foci of political history. Seeking synthesis through a concentration on "public culture" and a 
redemption of the discipline's debt to the public by de-emphasizing "technical" or 
quantitative expertise, as Thomas Bender proposes, threatens a counterproductive narrowing 
of the field and a needless renunciation of useful tools.43 The explanation of political
behavior--of masses and elites in and out of government, of policies adopted, and of the 
effects of those policies on different segments of the polity and the society--surely 
constitutes a worthwhile area in itself, as well as a reflection of political minds. 
The second major concentration in political history, electoral behavior, is particularly 
twinned with its political science counterpart, probably because, in American political science 
at least, electoral behavior is the most intensely studied subject. Yet whereas the so-called 
"new political historians" of the 1960s and early 1 970s were fully aware of and drew freely 
upon developments in their sister subdiscipline, something about political science, perhaps the 
advances in the typical level of mathematical techniques used in its books and articles, seems 
to have frightened off historians more recently. Still tied to the early Michigan School's 
social psychological approach, its stress on party identification, and its contention that the 
masses of voters have no settled or organized political opinions, political historians have 
largely ignored the controversy over issue voting, the debate over the effect of economic 
conditions on elections, advances in such statistical methods as logit, probit, simultaneous 
equations, and LISREL, and, most significantly, the development of the rational choice 
perspective. 44 
Paradoxically, at the same time that historians have seemingly ceased to read political 
science, political scientists have become more historical in outlook. Mesmerized by the 
powerful tool of survey analysis , possessing only a few scholarly nationwide polls, and 
mistrusting aggregate data because of the so-called "ecological fallacy," most American 
political scientists of the 1 950s and early 1 960s tended to ignore history and to state their 
findings as timeless generalizations. But the accumulation of three decades of opinion polls 
in America and other countries, the realization of disadvantages in sample surveys, and the 
development of statistical methods for overcoming problems of aggregation have led political 
scientists to pay much more attention to change, to emphasize different and variable factors 
in their explanations, and to investigate the pre-World War II era.45
There is much solid and stimulating research currently being done in American electoral 
history. Indeed, both the methods and leading concepts of the field have recently become an 
export item, balancing, to a degree, the American discipline's traditional intellectual trade 
deficits with Britain and France. Impressive if imperfect books by John Phillips and 
Kenneth Wald and a forthcoming monograph by Gary Cox raise the hope of settling 
questions about the development of the British party system and the nature of its social 
cleavages that traditional narrative and elite histories left forever open. 46 Although the
French may have forgotten the pioneering role of Andre Siegfried in electoral studies, books 
and articles by the Americans Thomas Beck, William Brustein, and Lynn Hunt have used 
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American-style statistical techniques to investigate questions about the social correlates and 
continuity of political tendencies in Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary France.47 Stanley
Suva! has transferred regression analysis and the ethnocultural thesis to Wilhelmine Germany, 
and a spate of books and dissertations, mostly American, though some of the best, German, 
have turned the question of the sources of the Nazi vote into perhaps the hottest current 
topic in electoral history.48
Despite all this commendable work--and there is much that I have left out here as well 
as a great deal, no doubt, of which I am ignorant--there is a palpable feeling of stagnation in 
the subfield. The two chief organizing concepts of the so-called "new political history" in 
America, the ethnocultural and critical elections theses, have ceased to develop theoretically 
and methodologically, and have been criticized so effectively that they have taken on the 
traits of what Imre Lakatos called "degenerating research programs.11 49 Without precluding
attempts to resuscitate them, I suggest that a shift from these social psychologically-inspired 
hypotheses to one derived from economics--rational choice--would reinvigorate political 
history and enable it to escape the current cul de sacs. 
History and social psychology are so ill-matched that it is a wonder that the affair has 
lasted so long. The original Michigan School considered political issues as evanescent and of 
little importance in elections, because voters, Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes found, 
were usually too wedded to parties, too unconcerned with politics, and too non-ideological 
and mentally disorganized to respond to ideas. 5o Political historians, on the other hand, have
traditionally focused almost exclusively on issues, have generally believed that politics 
mattered to their subjects, and have tended to treat the beliefs of the mass public as more 
coherent and standardized than even the most generous studies of modern public opinion find 
them to be. The American Voter took candidate strategies and electoral rules as exogenously 
given, and elites and local contexts as practically invisible. Historians have lavished attention 
on just these facets of politics. In the Michigan model, normality is the mode, and anything 
more than temporary deviations are difficult to explain. 5 1  Historians gravitate toward
change. The socialization literature tells us a lot about how children in general learn about 
politics, but little about why specific groups of people absorb different lessons, or how adults 
continue their education--topics with which historians are usually much more concerned.52
Michigan has little to say about legislatures, committees, bureaucracies, and policies; 
historians are or should be crucially absorbed in the study of these topics. Most important, 
Michigan is deterministic--party identification is a supplement to every baby's formula--but 
historians of nearly every ideological stripe tend to treat individuals or classes of people as 
having the ability to choose. 53
In each respect, rational choice theory, which seems increasingly dominant in political 
science, is a more attractive partner for political history. 54 Social, public, collective, or
rational choice theory- -no one phrase is yet standard--may be defined as the economic study 
of nonmarket decision-making, often employing formal logic, game theory, or other 
mathematical techniques to reach its conclusions. Like other economists, social choice 
theorists generally, but not always assume that the actors (usually individuals , but possibly 
groups with identical preference functions over relevant issues) are egoistic, rational utility 
maximizers. 55 Empiricists often study how well various social choice and other types of
models explain actual practices, or laboratory or computer-simulated results. 
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Two examples may serve to fix the body of theory for those previously unacquainted 
with it. In his pioneering Social Choice and Individual Values, Kenneth Arrow demonstrated 
that if one posits a few seemingly obvious traits of people's preferences, then in distressingly 
typical cases, no way of making decisions (such as majority rule) leads to consistent results. 
Among three proposals, for instance, the one that wins may depend on the order in which 
they are voted on. This is referred to as "the paradox of voting." The "Prisoners' Dilemma" 
is perhaps even better known. Two people have been arrested for allegedly committing a 
crime. Each is questioned separately and is made the following offer: 1 )  If neither of you 
confesses, you will both get a year in jail. 2) If both confess, both get five years. 3) If you 
confess and the other does not, you go free, while he gets ten years. 4) If he confesses and 
you do not, you get ten years, and he goes free. The dilemma is that each self-interested 
prisoner would prefer that his partner confesses, while he remains silent. But since both 
realize this, and since the penalty for "cooperating" (with the other prisoner by not 
confessing, not cooperating with the police!) if the other "defects" is so high, the only rational 
strategy if the game is played once is for each to confess. If each is local, therefore, each 
ends up with his third ranked choice, five years in jail. Studies of this very simple game 
have yielded interesting insights into wars, strikes, arms races, and other forms of 
bargaining. 56
In the field of electoral behavior, social choice treats issues and policies as central, for 
voters are assumed to minimize the distance between their preferences (which may include 
opinions about the candidates' personal traits) and the stances of those who seek their 
support. 57 Candidates, in turn, position themselves to win nominations, and parties, to win
elections by moving, or seeming to move toward popular orientations. Electoral politicians, 
committee chairmen, and bureaucrats shape voting rules and agendas so as to maximize their 
utilities. Electors adopt short-cuts to reduce the cost of gathering information and making 
decisions. Shifts in the inclinations of the voters or in candidate tactics modify outcomes and 
policies. Since all players in the game, particularly the officeholders and officeseekers, 
continually reassess the positions, past moves, and possible designs of the other participants, 
there is little stasis or determinism. The one important topic in political history not treated 
in this mode of analysis is that which neoclassical economics, from which public choice grew, 
has always slighted--the determinants of taste formation. 58 On this subject, historians will
learn little more from social choice than they have from social psychology. Indeed, it is the 
rational choice theorists' emphasis on preferences, their eagerness to take values seriously, 
that makes the approach so much more naturally complementary to the history of political 
ideas than that of social psychology. 
To gauge how the substitution of a rational choice for a social psychological or symbolic 
anthropological viewpoint might alter the way political history is written, one must first make 
clear how large theories are employed in the discipline. They seem to me to have both 
Lakatosian and Hemphelian functions. That is, they define research programs and supply 
covering laws. 59 Less grandly, they suggest topics, point to appropriate data, and provide
interpretative glosses. If adults are assumed to identify mindlessly with their parties, then 
researchers should concentrate on discovering lasting group loyalties and unraveling the 
socialization process, rather than on issues and elite strategy. Alignments should only 
gradually erode except when the disruptions of war or depression or a sudden change in the 
population of electors orients a set of predominantly new voters overwhelmingly in a 
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particular direction. Likewise, if politics is thought to have a primarily affective importance 
for the vast majority, then one should attend to the symbols and their manipulators, to 
campaign rituals and politicians' charisma, rather than to policies and their material effects 
and the relations in both directions between policy and the electorate. On the other hand, if 
politics is conceived of as an arena in which voters, politicians, and non-elected officials, all 
of whom have relatively well-ordered preferences, usually attempt to maximize tangible, 
rather than expressive benefits, then fluctuations in electoral outcomes and their 
correspondence with changes in rules, candidate strategies, and policy outputs become the 
very stuff of politics. 
By highlighting differences in the questions, choices of evidence, and ex-post rationales 
that the theories suggest, I do not mean to imply that such frameworks are noncomparable, 
disjoint, insulated from tests. Lakatos and Hempel do not necessarily exclude Popper.60
Indeed, a great deal of political science over the last two decades has been concerned with 
delineating and assessing the implications of the social psychological and rational choice 
outlooks,  and one of the concerns of political history in the future ought to be contributing 
to that ongoing controversy.6 1
The widely recognized theoretical and empirical gaps and anomalies in the still 
developing social choice field make it unlikely that historians will embrace this viewpoint 
unthinkingly.62 Disequilibria and counterintuitive notions lie at the very heart of the
outlook: Voting paradoxes are not only possible, but prevalent. The logic of free riding 
makes it difficult to understand why any rational human would ever vote or take part in any 
group activity unless directly paid to do so. For most realistic political games, there is no 
dominant strategy, and for most electoral situations, no stable solution. Social choice theorists 
are a combative and pessimistic lot, and the field contains more proofs of nonexistence and 
impossibility than certitude about the pattern of human actions. Historians who seek easy 
answers,  miracle cures from the social sciences, should not expect to find them here. 
In fact, it is just this skepticism about received notions, this doubting of traditional 
assumptions and conclusions, that makes social choice seem so appealing for empirical 
practioners--it reminds us not to let down our intellectual guard, and it makes us active 
participants, not passive consumers, in the process of discovery. Why, in light of the free 
rider principle, do people participate? How, if equilibria do not generally exist, do 
politicians choose issue stances? Is there empirical historical evidence that cooperation 
develops, as Axelrod suggests, because self-interested players realize that the political game 
will be played repeatedly, and that the best strategy for all concerned is what he calls "tit for 
tat" (i.e . ,  "cooperate" if the other does, but "defect" in retaliation if he defects)? What allows 
democracies to resolve conflicts without devolving into dictatorships or oligarchies, as many 
theoretical results predict? Which of the intuitively plausible assumptions of social choice 
that produce such troubling results should be replaced, which constraints loosened? How is 
rationality bounded in particular cases, to state the question in Herbert Simon's terms, or, to 
view it another way, what additional assumptions about information, uncertainty, and 
decision-making are necessary to model the real world?63 Like empirical political scientists
and experimental economists, historians may play a role in refining general theories. 
To draw some examples from the Civil War era, why did turnout rise in the north in the 
1 8 50s, and was it higher in states with close elections--where the stake for each voter and 
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party worker was higher- -than in those where one party won overwhelmingly? Why did the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act, but not the Missouri Crisis of 1 8 1 9  or the Mexican War of the 1840s 
lead to the formation of a viable antislavery political party? Why and how did the 
expectations of politicians as to the potential success of such a party change? Could the 
breakdown of compromise during the 1850s or during 1 865-66 usefully be modeled as the 
abandonment of cooperative strategies in a prisoners' dilemma game? Does the ability of the 
national government to avoid dictatorship and to preserve most conventional political 
procedures during the Civil War and Reconstruction imply that, far from reducing the 
number of axioms, social choice theorists need to add constitutional rules to their lists of 
assumptions? 
Yet the adumbration of theory will probably be less central in the study of past than of 
current politics for two reasons. First, the available data is ill-tailored for this purpose, and, 
unlike political scientists and economists, we cannot add items to future questionnaires or run 
experiments to generate more relevant information. Data deficiencies will force historians to 
be somewhat cleverer in devising methods of evaluating these theories than other social 
scientists usually need to be. Second, non- or anti-QUASSH historians are as unlikely as 
humanistically-oriented social scientists to acknowledge the importance of this enterprise or 
to be willing and able to take part in it, and such people compose a larger part of our 
discipline than of others. 
Besides its possible contribution to the production of generalizations about political 
behavior , a political history influenced by rational choice will differ from current practice in 
ten other respects, as well. The notions of critical elections and party systems and the 
ethnocultural thesis will not be abandoned, but their influence will be reduced and they will 
be seen in a different light.64 If analysts no longer expect that people chose a party and
then adhered to it unshakably, if party identification is considered, rather , a continuous short­
hand assessment of party and candidate performance and attractiveness, then patterns of 
electoral behavior should be expected to vary somewhat from election to election, depending 
on the degree of similarity of candidates, issues, and economic conditions. 65 Furthermore,
because the functions of various governments differed and changed over time, and because 
the sets of candidates and policy stances did as well, election results should often have 
diverged at the national and sub-national levels. If a critical election is seen as merely an 
occasion when an unusually large number of voters made untypically great changes in their 
expectations about which party at either the national, state, or local level was closer to their 
ideal points and was more likely to run the government competently, then variations in the 
patterns of voting at each governmental level should not be seen as anomalous, but merely 
rational. Moreover, the contention that local politics was somehow more fundamental than 
national politics would no longer make any sense if the two alignments were not assumed to 
be perfectly correlated.66 Ethnoreligious issues undoubtedly did dominate many local and
state, and some national elections, but their importance should not be assumed constant or 
universal any more than the significance of class or race or region or corruption or general 
economic performance or foreign policy or any other issues should be. Rather than trying to 
decide which of two alignments, usually class or ethnocultural, pervaded all the elections in a 
whole "era," political historians should be attempting to determine the mix of all issues that 
voter and candidate decisions propelled to the fore in each election and how these changed 
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from election to election.67 Critical elections will continue to attract  attention, but if
candidates and voters constantly monitored each other, then incremental, homeostatic 
adjustments should receive more emphasis than they do in current historiography.68
Second, collective action unconfined to formal political institutions will be viewed not as
a separate, largely emotional or symbolic sphere, but as merely another means of rationally 
seeking to attain political or economic objectives.69 Of course, many historians and other
social scientists have always considered this kind of behavior as fundamentally instrumental-­
labor union organizing and its suppression or discouragement, anti-abolitionist mobs in the 
pre-Civil War north ,  violence against southern Republicans during Reconstruction, the 
formation of producer interest groups and of organizations of consumers or potential 
consumers of governmental services. But if observers more often see conventional and extra­
institutional modes as complementary or as substitutes for each other, the scope of political 
history will be usefully extended, and questions such as why an individual or group chose a 
particular mix of actions at a particular time may be harder to ignore. For example, 
confronted by well-entrenched parties in the 1 830s, abolitionists organized primarily as an 
interest group, as farmers did in the 1 920s and 1930s under similar political conditions. The 
collapse of one major party in the 1 8 50s encouraged antislavery men to stream into a new 
political party, just as the frailty of state-level opposition parties in the south and west 
provided an opening for the Populist party in the 1 880s and 1 890s. Furthermore, employing 
models more explicitly in this area may lead to better founded generalizations about sets of 
events. As Charles Tilly has argued, most current collective action models are static and 
ignore the effects of interactions between participants. If an individual's decision to take 
part in a movement is contingent on what others do, then only a dynamic theory can explain 
why any actions get taken at all.70
A third major change will be that the study of regulation, policy, and the impacts of the 
economy on the government and the government on the economy will become more 
important and more integrated with other areas in political history. A considerable literature 
has grown up on the degree to which regulatory agencies were created or captured by the 
interests that they were supposed to regulate, and this body of scholarship will benefit from 
exposure to the new organizational economics and to theories of repeated prisoners' dilemma 
games, and from more self-conscious links with studies of elections and legislatures. 7 1  It
may well be that this area is the one in the American research that will eventually have the 
greatest international impact, because, though not all countries have contested elections, they 
do h ave bureaucracies. 
Some historians and students of business and bureaucracy have already made impressive 
starts.72 While Samuel P .  Hays, Robert H. Wiebe, Morton Keller, and others have adopted
the functionalist view that the development of the economy or increasing urbanization and 
industrialization necessarily brought increases in government regulatory activity or in social 
welfare schemes, Richard L. McCormick has shown that specific campaigns by politicians in 
New York and other states and by muckrakers across the nation convinced the articulate 
public and, subsequently, majorities of the voters that business corruption of politics 
adversely affected their interests and that new regulatory institutions run by "impartial 
experts" were needed to combat this problem. 73 Terence J. McDonald has demonstrated that
progressive politicians in San Francisco broke the consensus that taxes should be kept low and 
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government services, starved. Robert Margo has modeled racially discriminatory school 
boards, while Carl Harris has shown how relatively politically insulated administrators could 
partially mitigate short-term political trends in racial political power.74 These efforts to pry
open the "black box" of functionalism and to expose the individual motives and actions that 
perpetuated or permuted political institutions or shared understandings have a natural affinity 
with the individualistic , anti-deterministic theory of rational choice. Some of the freshest 
and most exciting recent work in political history, like Moliere's bourgeois gentleman, has 
been "speaking rational choice" without knowing it. 
Two related topics where historians can learn much from the other social sciences and 
where we can make major contributions, the study of the relationship of government to 
economic inequality and of the impact of economic conditions on voting, also deserve major 
attention .75 The attractiveness to candidates of the median voter's position suggests that
governments will tend, if they adopt redistributive policies at all, to reward the middling 
classes, rather than the rich or the poor. To what extent has this been true at different times 
and places and what accounts for any variations? Models of the so-called "political economy 
cycle" imply that governments try to pump up the economy in time for national elections. 
Has this been the case historically, and, if so, for how long, and how did incumbents and 
voters obtain sufficient knowledge about economic conditions to be able to act and react? 
How heavily did voters weigh the economic fluctuations of the mid-nineteenth century, 
particularly the depressions of the 1 830s and the 1 870s, in comparison with other factors, in 
making their voting decisions? The hypothesis states that economic growth in countries 
subject to self-interested intervention in the economy by politicians ought to show a regular 
pattern of fluctuations. What about these countries in the past, or the economies of nations 
without competitive elections in both the past and the present? 76
Fourth ,  there will be more emphasis on legislatures.77 Under what circumstances do
legislatures make large and small changes in the structures and levels of funding of 
government? How are these associated with elections? 78 Were the innovations of the
Congress elected in 1 866 less than those of Congresses that took office after "critical 
elections"? To what extent are such extraordinary alterations due to elite turnover within or 
between parties? 79 In the nineteenth century, when there was much more turnover in
Congressional seats than there is today, was there more or less legislative policy change than 
currently? What types of policies were adopted consensually, which ones provoked conflict 
and delay, how did the mix of these vary from time to time and from place to place, and to 
what degree did uncertainty and differential access to information and expertise account for 
such variations?80 What devices did legislators use to push or block programs? To what
degree were they ideologues, and to what degree, opportunists seeking to enhance their 
chances for reelection or higher office? How did they interact with bureaucrats and interest 
groups? How did the increasingly professionalized state education departments of the mid­
to late nineteenth century, for instance, cooperate with the short-term amateurs who sat on 
state legislative committees on education? Roll call analyses have sometimes been criticized 
for diminishing the role of leaders and for understating the contingent and dynamic elements 
in legislative outcomes. The extensive social science literature on logrolling and vote trading 
should p rovide a useful corrective. 8 1
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Fifth, what strategies did candidates adopt under various conditions? Did they appear to 
move toward the voter with median opinions, as theoretical models suggest, and if not, why 
not? Did pressures from their "core constituencies" or from activists' ideologies lead them to 
take differing stands on issues and to adopt non-consensual policies in office? Did the white 
and black extremists who constituted the major blocs of the southern Democratic and 
Republican parties, respectively, inevitably drive the two parties apart during Reconstruction 
and destroy the chances of moderates?82
Sixth , did electors behave as if they had adopted some simple, common decision rule, 
such as economic retrospective voting or a checklist of performance items, and under what 
conditions does voting become more concerned with non-pocketbook issues?83 Seventh ,
what distortions did electoral and allocation rules introduce into the political process and how 
consequential were they for the fundamental question of politics--who gets what? How did 
the rules shape the game that politicians and voters played?84
Eighth, the new tools of social choice and principal-agent theories may help to 
reintegrate judicial into political history. If the courts "follow[ed] the 'illection' returns," did 
they respond to the median voter? What incentives did judges as principals use to control 
other judges, litigants, and potential litigants, and how were judges as agents influenced by 
executives, legislators, and constitution-makers? Did litigants as principals view the courts as 
separate from other facets of politics, or did they attempt to reach their goals by 
simultaneously or sequentially playing the game in several political arenas?85 How did
judicial rules and agendas change, and what impacts did such modifications have? Explicit 
theory may offer some illumination on these and other traditional questions in legal history, 
and legal history may in turn alter the "stylized facts" that the theorists must attempt to 
encompass. 
Ninth, since social choice inevitably reopens large, often normative questions, a 
reoriented political history will necessarily counter the criticism that it must be mired in 
detailed, particularistic studies that ignore broad topics of lasting significance.86 The value­
laden problems of how individuals should act to attain their goals, how fair rules should be 
written, and how political institutions should be structured so as to be responsive to public 
opinion are never far away from the descriptive problems of how, in specified instances, 
people did act, how procedures were set out, how bodies were organized. By self-consciously 
attending to "scientific" contemporary theorizing, historians will therefore simultaneously 
return toward the traditional role of history as "philosophy teaching by example." 
Finally, historians will have to refresh their mathematics or learn more in order to be 
able to acquaint themselves with the new literature in economics and political science. 
Without a fair acquaintance with calculus, a bit of linear algebra and microeconomics, and a 
good deal of statistics, many of these works will be inaccessible and their consequences-­
which should be considered as alternatives to traditional notions even if they are ultimately 
rejected--will be untestable. 
Having specified some of the changes that I hope will come about in political history, let 
me close by emphasizing what my proposal is not designed to do. I do not favor abandoning 
any subfield. In particular , the history of political ideas will continue to be robust, but it  
will h ave  to become, as well, more rigorous. Nor would I ban any type of evidence, although 
that which can most easily and meaningfully quantified will be privileged in most inquiries, 
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simply because i t  facilitates systematic evaluations. I also strongly doubt that it is either 
possible or desirable to subsume large chunks of history under a single substantive rubric. It 
seems to me more probable that republicanism, liberalism, sectionalism, class or ethnic or 
sexual conflict, modernization, the rise of capitalism or large organizations, the growth of the 
state will all be stressed at various times and places, but none exclusively. While rational 
choice theory seems to me a most promising framework, I am far from contending that it be 
the only one. It has its deficiencies, its empty and blind spots, and its critics.87 What I do
insist upon is that the historian explicitly adopt a theory, and that he or she do so in full 
knowledge of criticisms that have been made of it, not as if theorists were infallible 
"authorities." A young and still growing research program, social choice should not be 
exempt from criticism, but it ought, as Lakatos commonsensically urged, to be sheltered from 
premature rejection. 88
The historian need not become an economic theorist or an expert on the thought of 
Machiavelli or Harrington in order to complete her study. Rather, she need only be an 
intelligent and critical consumer of others' theories and findings, willing and able to assess 
the implications of those studies for her case, and perhaps vice-versa. The vast majority of 
works will not span the entire range from thought and culture, through electoral politics, 
legislative, administrative, and judicial action, to policy outputs and impacts, and some 
scholars will merely propose, rather than test hypotheses. But the strands of political as well 
as other histories should be more closely interwoven. In the past, historians have gone to 
great lengths to examine every relevant document collection. In the future, they should feel 
just as uncomfortable if they have not mastered the appropriate theory and methods and 
absorbed the findings of empirical work elsewhere on the spectrum of political history. 
Moreover, they need to take into account the pertinent implications of social and economic 
histories. How did the pattern of apparently high geographic mobility in America, for 
example, affect the stability of political formations or its measurement? How can we 
reconcile trends in economic inequality, which, according to Jeffrey Williamson and Peter 
Lindert, rose during the "Age of Egalitarianism" and the "Progressive Era," but not during the 
"Gilded Age," with interpretations of the politics of those periods?89
The realization that a regime or a discipline is in crisis stimulates many conflicting 
analyses of the reasons for the dilemma, and many proposals for solutions. While most of 
those who have recently focused on the fragmentation of historical study have suggested, in 
effect, that coherence be reimposed by concentrating on one aspect of the subject--most 
often, thought or "culture"--! submit that such projects will only narrow and isolate political 
history, and that a common approach and a realization of the interrelationships of all the sub­
categories of the field is a more promising way to seek unity. More important, viewing 
politics as a series of conscious decisions by political actors, elite as well as mass, who,  
constrained by legal and extralegal rules, seek to attain their value-laden goals , offers a better 
way of understanding political processes and outcomes. 
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Figure 1 :  A One-Dimensional Spatial Model of the Slavery Issue 
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Figure 2: A Two-Dimensional Spatial Model of the Union and Slavery Issues 
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Figure 3:  A Spatial Model of the Positive and Negative Liberalism Thesis 
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Figure 4: An Individual's Opinion Matrix 
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